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Legal ethics for a fragmented society:
between professional and personal
ALLAN

C. HUTCHINSON*

Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Ontario, Canada

The lawyer is always in a hurry. He has become keen and shrewd; ...
but his soul is small and righteous.
Plato
The legal profession has never been much loved. From Plato through Charles
Dickens to Tom Wolfe, literature attests eloquently to its impugned status. As
much envied as reviled, the reputation and prestige of lawyers is now
considered by many to be at an all-time low. Its image as a noble and
honourable profession is in tatters. Society tends to view lawyers as a rich and
elite profession that is more interested in its own pocketbook than the public
interest. The number of savage jokes about lawyers would be funny if they
did not touch a raw nerve: after all, humour is not so much an escape from
reality as from despair. In receipt of a professional monopoly, lawyers are
considered self-interested and undeserving of their privileged right to govern
themselves. Indeed, the legal profession is seen to epitomise George Bernard
Shaw's quip that "every profession is a conspiracy against the laity". However,
while a similar sense of dissatisfaction and anxiety is evident inside the less
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crass sectors of the profession, the more familiar refrain is that any crisis is
attributable to the fact that the profession once had a shared sense of legal
ethics and professional responsibility which has been lost. Having become
too much a corporate business than a public vocation, it is urged that the legal
profession must revert to this traditional esprit de corps if it is to regain its
respectability and stature: lawyers must reclaim the ethical legacy of noble
lawyers past.
Like most expressions of nostalgia, this characterisation of the perceived
crisis and its proffered solution has some grounding in reality. But it is as
much a pious pretence as a genuine remedy for institutional ills. The profession
has indeed become more business-like in operation and, as a result, more
corporate in attitude; legal services are treated as one more commodity to be
bought and sold in the marketplace. This tendency has been facilitated by the
traditional view of legal ethics which puts service-the belief that lawyers do
not have responsibility for the law and its development, but only for the
satisfaction of their clients' wishes-before justice.

1

Moreover, it is most

definitely not the case that the cure for the perceived professional blight is
a return to the values and standards of yesteryear. On the contrary, what is
required is the development of a fresh approach to legal ethics that is both
sensitive to the changing shape and style of modem legal practice and, at the
same time, demands that lawyers aspire to a more diverse and critical selfimage. Accordingly, mindful that the homogeneity of lawyers is beginning to
be replaced by more diverse personnel, the theme of this article will be to
assess the implications that the challenge of a fragmented society and legal
profession holds for the critical development of a transformed practice of
professional responsibility.

After sketching the different demands and design of a fragmented society,
I will concentrate on how the legal profession itself is beginning to fragment
and what that means for existing accounts of legal ethics. In particular, my
focus will be on how it is vital to rethink present understandings of
lawyers' ethical personae and to canvass future possibilities for a more
compelling vision of a professional modus vivendi. Emphasising the
Canadian predicament, I will argue that a fragmented society deserves a
fragmented legal profession which, in tum, warrants a more fragmented
idea and implementation of legal ethics. There must be a shift of
emphasis from professional regulation to personal responsibility. As well as
indicating the shape and direction that such a revised ethical stance might
take, I explore the more substantive and concrete consequences for legal
education and professional practice. My ambition is not to promote a particular
set of ethical outcomes or inculcate a specific mode of professional
responsibility; it is to challenge students and lawyers to develop a professional
modus vivendi of their own that constructs as it constantly challenges and
re-works an appropriate professional attitude and practice. In the same
way that there is no one or unchanging way to be a good person, there is
no one or unchanging way to be a good lawyer: each and every lawyer
must be capable of developing a style and substance of lawyering that
incorporates a continuing dialogue-with oneself, clients, other lawyers, other
professionals, and the community at large-about what counts as good
lawyering. The central question is whether it is ever acceptable that lawyers
might, can or should act in a professional capacity in such a way that it would
be contrary to their own moral values.2

Traditional ethics
The traditional image of the ethical lawyer has remained largely static and
unchanged for many decades. It is centred on the idea that lawyers are
super-technocrats; they possess an expert set of talents and techniques which
they deploy for the advantage of those people who hire them. Regarding
themselves as being neutral on the substance and form of the law, their task
is very much to apply the law, perhaps to criticise it a little, but most
certainly not to make it. Lawyers' commitment is to the legal system which,
even when they are working around and within it, must be accepted as given.
Almost indifferent to who their clients are, lawyers think of themselves as
more chosen than choosing. The relationship between lawyer and client is built
upon trust and respect: clients are to trust lawyers to act in the clients' best
interests and, in.return, lawyers will respect the clients' autonomy. It is not for
lawyers to impinge upon the clients' autonomy, but to act on behalf of the
clients to realise their interests and inspirations. The lawyer is expected to
treat all clients exactly the same in the sense that they are each citizens who
have had their rights infringed and want relief or vindication. Advocacy and
action tends, therefore, to be standardised and routinised. Insofar as lawyer
and clients are from different cultures and classes, lawyers are expected to
bridge the gap by personal empathy and professional solidarity.
Although the validity and merit of this ethical self-image is almost
taken for granted by most lawyers and jurists, it is based on certain
foundational premises about law, society and ways of thinking about them.
Like all operating assumptions, they are more controversial than many
traditionalists care to think or acknowledge. Some of the more important ones

are that:
• Law is objective and certain-the hallmark of good lawyers is considered
to be found in their cultivation of rule-craft in which the ability to identify
the extant rules of the legal system and apply them to particular situations is
paramount. As such, law has considerable stability and independence, offers
operationally

determinate

guidance

to

the

trained

lawyer,

and

is

institutionally distinct from the more open-minded disputations around
ideological politics.
• All clients are to be treated the same-all clients have pre-established
interests and come to lawyers to have their rights vindicated. The task of
lawyers is to accept any clients that seek their services and to utilise their
common expertise in pursuing the interests of their clients in such a way
that justice will be done and the Rule of Law upheld.
• The criminal trial is the paradigm of legal responsibility-the basic dynamic
of the legal system is traceable to the adversarial contest between
individual and state in the criminal process. While the roles of lawyers vary
in civil trials and non-adversarial contexts, their basic responsibilities can
be extrapolated from the institutional setting of the criminal brief.
• Lawyering is an apolitical undertaking-lawyers pursue their clients' interests
through the extant rules, procedures and venues of law: overt politicisation
is severely frowned upon. While lawyers engage in struggles that arise in
and have consequences for politics, lawyering is a neutral exercise that
does not implicate lawyers in any political process and that insists upon no
commitment to any particular ideology.
As attractive and as comforting as this traditional image of legal ethics and

professional responsibility may be to legal practitioners, its problems are
manifest and manifold. It fails theoretically, empirically and ideologically-it is
based upon a formalistic theory of law that is largely discredited and defunct
as a serious attempt to understand law and its operation. It describes a version
of legal practice that no longer has any empirical validity or historical
accuracy, if it ever did have; and it defends both its informing theory and
governing practice of lawyering as apolitical in such a way that merely serves
to underline its very definite ideological commitments.3 However, for present
purposes of highlighting the traditional model of the ethical lawyer, there are
two underlying premises which are most pertinent--one is the notion of a
reasonably homogenous and uniform legal profession and the other is the idea
of a role-differentiated and rule-based morality.
First, the traditional image of the ethical lawyer asks lawyers to
subordinate their personal morality and identity to the standardised
requirements of a role-defined rule-based morality. It assumes that legal
professionals will appreciate and actualise the demands of a roledifferentiated morality in which lawyers' duties are exclusively bounded by
the law and the professional code of conduct on one side and the clients'
interests on the other. It is a two-dimensional moral universe in which
lawyers are no more expected to intrude their own personal values than actors
or butlers in the performance of their duties.4 Such a notion allows persons to
claim moral legitimacy for actions that might be considered illegitimate in
other, different roles and contexts. Moreover, once in this professional role,
lawyers are required to treat morality in the same way that they deal with
law-as an exhaustive body of rules that can be formally applied to resolve the
most recalcitrant of difficulties and dilemmas. Consequently, in the

traditional approach, there is very little space for reflection or engagement;
reference to the professional codes is intended to provide definitive and
authoritative answers.
Secondly, the traditional image and professional codes are (not so
subtly) underpinned with the view of the white, male lawyer as an independent
professional who deals with a range of legal tasks and who is driven as much
by civic pride as commercial ambition; lawyers are a homogeneous group
who engage in broadly similar work. This notion of the fungible lawyer who
inhabits, with only slight variation and adaptation, all the offices and activities
throughout society is a myth. The reality is that, while such anachronisms
exist, they are the exception rather than the rule. Indeed, there is no longer one
image of the lawyer; they are an increasingly heterogenous and stratified bunch
whose backgrounds, ambitions and standards are much less uniform than was
previously the case. However, the legal profession is becoming more
diversified, it remains a very stratified profession in which the white male
lawyers still exercise the most control over the regulation and self-image of
the profession. It is to the critique of these two premises-the existence of a
homogenous legal profession and the worth of a role-differentiated and rulebased morality-that I now turn.

Fragmented profession
Whether there ever has been one type of lawyer or one kind of legal practice,
Canada's legal profession at the end of the twentieth century comprises many
types of lawyers and many kinds of legal practice. Although the Canadian
literature is not as extensive or as thorough as that of the United Kingdom

and the United States,5 there is ample evidence to support the developing view
that talk of one legal profession is almost becoming fanciful; there is such a
horizontally and vertically differentiated set of people and organisations
engaging in different sorts of legal practice that generalisations are as
unfounded as they are misleading. The profession is differentiated into megafirms,

smaller

partnerships,

and

single

practitioners,

not to

mention

government lawyers and the like; there is little shared experience, little
interaction between them and each operate in line within different cultures and
norms. Indeed, the idea that there is a unified legal profession is not only
mythical, but has an insidious bearing on legal ethics. From its elite status at
Confederation, the legal profession has become increasingly fragmented, both
in terms of diversity (different people and forms of organisation) and
stratification (a hierarchical order to such diversity). Unfortunately, there has
been a marked tendency for the benefits of diversity to be neutralised by the
imposition of stratification: the new and diverse personnel are relegated to the
marginalised periphery of the legal profession. While the profession has
diversified, the typical lawyer remains male, white, Englishspeaking, early
middle-aged, and Christian: other lawyers who deviate from this norm are
greater in number, but still less powerful in prestige and influence.6
Legal practice is shaped by many factors, both external and internal to
it. In recent decades, the Canadian legal profession has been strongly
influenced by a variety of environmental forces over which it has very little
control: decreasing state regulation; the juridification of dispute-resolution; the
re-structuring of the economy; the extent of globalisation; and the spread of
computerisation and information technology. Not surprisingly, these external
forces have been mediated through a set of internal filters that affect their

impact on the workings of the legal profession. 7 The first thing to note is
that there is no longer a Canadian legal profession-there are many different
ones, ranging from the solo practice to the large corporate bureaucracy through
the small partnerships and government lawyers. The days of the fungible
lawyer or legal practice are long gone. There is a wide range of lawyering types
who engage in a wide variety of practices. Who does law (men and women,
young and old, black and white, etc.), where they do it (office towers,
shopping malls, clinics, home basements, government offices, mobile vans,
etc.), how they do it (with entrepreneurial flair, part-time, on a shoe-string, as
big business, etc.), who they do it for (aboriginal people, rich individuals,
international conglomerates, homeless, small businesses, etc.), and what they
do it for (subsistence income, personal satisfaction, enormous income,
political influence, etc.) has gone through a transformation. However, as well
as there being a greater diversification of the legal profession, there has been a
marked increase in the stratification. Lawyers are distinguished not only by
what they do, but the professional satisfaction, financial reward, public
esteem and political influence that they experience.
The size of the Canadian legal profession increased by 430% from 1931 to
1986 and went from 2,710 members in 1986 to 49,680 in 1996. This
translated in Ontario into the lawyer/population ratio jumping from 1/1142 in
1960 to 1/574 in 1981. As Figures 1 and 2 show, the proportion of different
ethnicities,

genders, nationalities and religious affiliations has changed

significantly: while the percentage of lawyers born in Canada has reduced
slightly, the general diversity has improved significantly. As regards the
organisation and hierarchy of legal practice, Figures 3 and 4 reflect the
increasing variety of ways in which lawyers practice law. However,
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there are certain forms of legal practice that are much more prestigious than
others and certain differences have some definite implications for legal ethics.
In particular, not only do the elite firms have greater access to the law society
bodies that develop the rules and culture of the profession, but the sole
practitioner is much more likely to be subject to formal monitoring by the

profession. In short, big-time lawyers establish the standards of good lawyering
and ensure that small-time lawyers live up to them. A refusal to abandon the
assumption of a homogeneous profession, even in the face of a statistically
diverse one, will not only be mismatched to the needs of the public and the
profession, but will also exacerbate stratification and hierarchy in the
profession.
These changes worked by the external forces operating on the structure
and

Figure 3. Industrial distribution of lawyers (II Community, Business & Personal Services; 1111

Public Administration;
Private Industry).
Source: Statistics Canada, Census of Canada, Occupation by Industry, decennial publications;
special tabulations for 1986.
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work of the legal profession and its internal re-organisation and economy
have exerted a strong influence on the governance of the profession and the
status of legal ethics. As well as important changes in the nature of law and
legal education, the different kinds of legal practice mean that the effort to
impose a unitary and uniform system of governance on the legal profession is
coming under increasing pressure; the different constituencies agitate for very
different initiatives and regimes of collective supervision. The debates over
continuing legal accreditation, articling, diversity, and malpractice insurance
pit one part of the profession squarely against another. At its most extreme,
this unrest and division of interests will likely precipitate moves to remove
or, at least, curtail the legal profession's monopoly. As for legal ethics, the
consequences of these external and internal pressures are affecting both the
establishment of shared common norms and their enforcement. There are a
series of small sub-cultures that have developed and standardised their own
standards and expectations for ethical behaviour: small-town family lawyers
operate in a different milieu to the metropolitan corporate deal-makers. In
this kind of professional climate, it is even more difficult to sustain the idea
that there are a common set of rules and expectations that can both educate
and discipline the legal profession in matters of ethical practice.

Roles and rules
Traditional views and understandings about what it means to be an ethical
lawyer are based upon narrow and unrealistic assumptions about what ethical
decisions address and involve, who lawyers are and what they do, what
constitutes law, and the professional contexts in which these arise. To be a

legal professional is to enter into a community that has developed a shared set
of normative practices and expectations that it is authorised or prepared to
enforce in the face of recalcitrant behaviour. While several devices are used
to curb and monitor lawyers' behaviour, codes of professional conduct lie at the
heart of the profession's focus on legal ethics and responsibility. The reasons
for having codes of professional conduct are fairly obvious-to educate lawyers
on communal expectations; to affect behaviour; and to offer a basis for
discipline. However, law societies have tended to develop and adapt their
professional rules in response to problems that arise: it has been a reactive and
unambitious approach that lacks any underlying direction or purpose. Some
critics have insisted that such codes are little more than ethical windowdressing; they serve to legitimate what lawyers do and impose control over
economic competition. What passes for talk of ethical standards is, at best, a
stylised form of professional regulation and, at worst, a self-serving paean to
professional prestige. 8 In short, professional bodies are, through their codes
and rules, often as interested in enforcing collegial conformity as fostering a
sense of ethical purpose; there is a lingering suspicion that the rules do more
to promote professional self-interest and little to affect ethical behaviour or
debate among practising lawyers.
To read any of the provincial codes of professional conduct is to
encounter a series of pronouncements that are long on righteous aspiration
and vague generalities, but short on serious instruction and concrete guidance.
It is a case of not seeing the ethical forest for the law-like trees. Although
lawyers are weighed down with discrete and detailed directives on this or
that matter, there is little to counsel the floundering or jaded lawyer in
establishing an overall and professional modus vivendi. Like the formalist

lawyering that many claim to embody and extol, ethics is reduced to a
technical compliance with a set of simple do's and don'ts-more of a shopping
list than a genuine effort to inculcate a style and substance of legal practice
that addresses the whole lawyer not merely the occasional legal transaction. It
is as much about conformity as it is about conscience. Lawyers approach ethics
in the same way that they approach law-as a set of rules to be mastered and
manipulated to serve the purpose in hand. Indeed, under the sway of a
legalistic mentality, the teaching of legal ethics and responsibility is more like
a course on office management; it is as much about techniques in filing and
organisation as it is about thinking through dilemmas and difficulties.
Even assuming that the various codes are treated as representing a serious
attempt at ethical instruction and control, an exclusive concentration on the
rules is misplaced. There is little to be gained by providing an elaborate
and exhaustive annotation of the rules of professional conduct because,
not only has this been adequately done, but it ignores the very real fact that
the influence on lawyers' daily routines and rituals is small: the constant
attention to and re-drafting of the rules is of decreasing marginal utility.9
Nevertheless, this does not mean that the codes have no place in any
appreciation of legal ethics and their actual improvement; they are an
important resource in discussion and decision-making, but they are not a
decisive or determinate play-book that relieves lawyers of the personal
responsibility to develop an ethical style and substance of legal practice. The
codes are a site at which ethical debate can be joined and developed. As with
many catalogues of rights and responsibilities, there will be competing and
occasionally contradictory imperatives; duties to one's clients might suggest
a different course of action to those recommended by the lawyers'

responsibilities as an officer of the court. In some instances, the rules demand
that lawyers "must" make certain choices and give priority to certain
actions. However, the rules more often offer no definite resolution and
simply provide a rudimentary framework within which lawyers can debate
and develop an ethical practice of law. It is important therefore to remember
that the rules do not and cannot relieve lawyers of the continuing
responsibility to exercise their own professional and moral judgement about
the appropriate course to follow. In many ways, therefore, the interpretation of
the professional

codes and rules resembles

other modes of legal

interpretation. In the same way that the meaning of constitutional or statutory
law is not fixed or exhausted by their textual renderings, so the requirements
of professional responsibility and legal ethics are not reducible to the four
textual corners of the codes. Both require reference to a wide range of
interpretive aids and sources, including conventions, customs, tradition,
cultural expectations, institutional norms, and social values. As with teaching
legal doctrine generally, little is achieved by simply asking students to learn
rote-like the rules of professional conduct without also providing them with
some critical framework within which to understand how those particular
rules came into being, what they are intended to do, etc. It is the same with
legal ethics. If students are taught only the rules of professional conduct, they
will be ill-prepared to adapt those sweeping injunctions to changing
circumstances or to respond to uncertainty in the rules' meaning or
application. As so much contemporary jurisprudence insists, it is never
possible simply to "follow the rules" as the question of what "the rules" mean
and what it means to "follow" them are never beyond dispute.

10

Legal

interpretation is an ungrounded practice in that it cannot be engaged in

without taking a stand on values or choices that are themselves always
open to challenge; the distinction between "following the rules" and
"following one's conscience" is neither as clear nor as uncontroversial as
traditionalists suggest. Accordingly, the suggestion that a viable and satisfying
legal ethics can be maintained by adopting the professional role of a ruleordered mentality is sorely mistaken.
As presently practised, legal ethics is more than unthinking compliance
with the prevailing rules of professional conduct in order to avoid discipline
or disrepute; it already involves resort to personal conscience in order to
determine what is a professionally appropriate course of action. 11 Like general
ethics, legal ethics is contextual in the sense that it involves particular people
in particular situations making difficult decisions

with particular time

constraints, with imperfect information and with particular consequences for
particular people. And, of course, there is no context of contexts that allows
people to fix once and for all their obligations and actions when acting in
personal or professional roles. There are few right answers that stand outside
any context or debate. The traditional understandings and expectations are
after all nothing more (or less) than the accumulated practices of lawyers that
have been affixed with institutional authority; lawyers can and should
contribute to as much as respond to the developing culture oflawyering. In this
way, they are in a better position to cultivate a modus vivendi that enables
them to bring together the promptings of their personal conscience with the
demands of their professional occupation. Legal ethics ought to be an active
meditation on law and lawyering rather than a passive and neutral adherence
to a professional code. Indeed, the rules are less of a set of directives from
which lawyers can draw clear guidance, but more a collection of practical

wisdom with which lawyers can engage and contest.

12

Accordingly,

compliance with law, in both its spirit and letter, does not amount to
acceptable ethical behaviour: professional morality is more than law-abiding
conformity. The fact that most decisions and practices by lawyers allow for a
variety of manoeuvres or results means that lawyers need to develop a
professional facility to comprehend and handle such challenges; there is
rarely an obvious or incontestable path to follow.
Although it is often forgotten by most lawyers, the study of legal ethics
is a branch of ethics generally; it is not a subject unto itself. At its broadest,
ethics involves a meditation on what is wrong and right and, most
importantly, how such standards are arrived at and validated. Traditionally,
the task was to elaborate and justify a set of ethical norms that provide an
authoritative code that people could consult and follow in resolving difficult
dilemmas. However, faith in the possibility of sketching such a body of
enduring and universally valid rules has been waning. There is now the less
absolutist and more sceptical acceptance that ethics is a much more situational
practice that cannot claim objective or neutral justification. As with general
ethics, the prevailing standards of right and wrong do not exhaust ethical
inquiry into legal professionals' behaviour; those standards must themselves be
subject to scrutiny and challenge. The different ethical theories seek to
examine critically conventional moral judgements and practices; they offer
methods and devices through which to justify or condemn particular moral
answers to controversies or dilemmas. There are almost as many ethical
theories as there are ethical philosophers. Inmany instances, all ethical theories
will converge on a similar set of generally accepted norms and standards of
moral conduct. However, many moral theorists contend that a moral approach

to life consists of more than a hell-or-highwater allegiance to one overarching
code of moral rules and principles; there will be a pragmatic willingness to
resist hard-and-fast solutions that are supposed to work in all situations.
None of this should be taken to mean that ethical behaviour and decisionmaking is condemned to be irrational or arbitrary, only that what counts and
operates as reason is never outside of its informing context. In this way, legal
ethics can be viewed less as a fixed and independent code of professional
conduct and more as continuing practice within which lawyers construct
acceptable norms of behaviour as they struggle to comply with them. To be
an ethical lawyer involves more than learning and applying a set of rules; it
also demands the cultivation of a critical reflection upon the professional role
and responsibilities of lawyers. In short, a fully ethical practice requires an
independent sense of moral virtue that involves the life-long development of
personal moral character. Because there is no one answer to ethical dilemmas,
it does not mean that reasoning can be abandoned or that "anything goes".
In ethical debate, a wide range of answers to arguments can be
supported by sophisticated chains of reasoning: moral reasoning is not,
therefore, something that stands outside or in judgement on moral decisionmaking, it is made and re-made in the situational process of moral
engagement and debate. As such, what counts as a good moral reason is a
matter of justification and persuasion, not proof and authority. Accordingly, I
do not offer a recommendation that is relativistic (or nihilistic) in which each
person's conception of right and wrong is as good as or as valid as anyone
else's. While values are constructed with particular social and historical
contexts, standards do develop about what is and is not acceptable behaviour,
even though those standards are never themselves outside of debate and

transformation. My approach does have the merit of demanding that, if ethical
issues are to be taken seriously, there must be an acceptance that debate and
reflection on moral issues is a useful and worthwhile pursuit and that the
upshot of such engagement might have an effect upon or make a difference
to a person's decisions and actions. Most importantly, it suggests that acting
ethically is not about adherence to a code that is resorted to in occasional
moments of indecision, but is about the development of a moral way of living
and lawyering that encompasses an organic set of attitudes, dispositions and
values and that can be incorporated into each lawyer's daily routines and
regimen. It is to such a recommendation and its practical implications that I
now tum.

Personal and professional
From a sceptical perspective, therefore, legal ethics is not about perfecting
universalisable and enduring codes of conduct. It is about developing a
transformative and pluralistic practice that respects the contingent and the
particular and allows for diverse answers and appreciations. The traditional
concepts and practices of honesty, confidentiality, trust, etc. remain most
pertinent, but they are given meaning and bite as the context varies; they are
fundamental, but not absolute values in the legal ethics vocabulary. As Lon
Fuller pointed out, there is a vast difference between a professional duty that is
based on "duty" as opposed to "aspiratiori. 13 Whereas the former focuses on
compliance with a set of rules and concentrates on what is not to be done
rather than what ought to be done, the latter speaks in more positive terms
and asks professionals to develop a style of practice that inspires ethical

conduct rather than merely avoids unethical acts. The traditional emphasis on
code-based morality breeds a mentality that is more concerned with delineating
how far a lawyer can go without engaging in unethical conduct: it tends to
privilege social conformity over efforts to build moral character. It is important
therefore that lawyers do not internalise the view that it is ethical to do
whatever is not prohibited by the professional rules; this is an impoverished
and thin view of professional responsibility and legal ethics.
In contrast to understanding the demands of legal ethics as being
satisfied by the memorisation of appropriate institutionalised responses

to

particular factsituations, it ought to be about developing a framework within
which to understand and reflect about the inevitable ethical dilemmas that
acting as a professional throws up. As such, legal ethics should be a vibrant
and dynamic way of being a lawyer that is not something that lawyers
simply refer to in stereotypical situations, but is an integral dimension of
what it means to be a good lawyer that pervades and infiltrates professionals'
whole way of thinking about and acting as lawyers. In developing such a
notion and practice of professional ethics, the challenge is neither to
abandon a sense of personal morality and defer all ethical responsibility to
the unique role and status of the legal professional nor to adhere entirely to the
dictates of one's personal conscience and ignore the special responsibilities
that attach to being a professional. It is a matter of creating a balance between
the two such that it is possible to bring together the professional and the
personal in a legal ethics that satisfies the pushes of personal morality and
the pulls of professional conduct. To do otherwise is either to relinquish
personal responsibility entirely to the self-interested norms of official codes
of professional conduct or to ignore entirely the genuine framework of

professional responsibilities that must influence and affect the dictates of
personal conscience. It most definiteJy is not a choice between law and
morality, such that the true professional must abandon all efforts to be a
good person in being a good lawyer.
Instead of positing professional ethics and personal morality as being
entirely separate and, at times, being in direct conflict, it is much more useful
and desirable to view one's ethical responsibility as a professional to be part
of one's personal morality as an individual. Having developed a personal
sense of moral integrity, lawyers should not be faced with the possibility that
it will be jeopardised rather than reinforced by the need to subordinate
personal values to professional goals.14 To ask lawyers to forgo moral
judgement is to reduce them to amoral technicians with significant
drawbacks and limitations-the practice and defence of a role-differentiation
is only sustainable if there is widespread support for and confidence in the
institutional processes of law, and this is surely suspect. Ignoring moral
considerations, lawyers will begin to be more competitive and less cooperative,

more opportunistic and less principled,

and more self-

regarding and less committed. Moreover, on the basis that lawyers tend to
identify more than most with their jobs, the amorality of their professional
role will begin to infect their personal lives-the amorality will become its
own impoverished morality by default: "lawyers' sensitivities can atrophy
or narrow to fit the constricted universe dictated by role".

15

Strict

adherence to a strong role-differentiation asks lawyers to engage in a form of
moral schizophrenia. This has considerable costs to lawyers-their sense of
moral judgement atrophies; they lose track of what is and is not important; and
their clients are reduced to nothing more than fee-generating opportunities. 16

Accordingly, while legal ethics does not simply collapse into personal
morality, there has to be a recognition that "role-differentiated behaviour" has
a legitimate claim on the attention of those who strive to be ethical lawyers.
Although lawyers must assume personal responsibility for their professional
activities, it does not mean that they must only do as a lawyer what they
would do as an individual (which, in many cases, might tum out to be very
extensive). It simply asks them to answer to themselves about the extent of
dissonance that a professional-differentiated role should allow. Mindful of the
social and political realities in which they offer their professional services,
lawyers must confront the consequences of their choices about who to
represent, the methods of representation and the broader consequences of
their work. If lawyers did permit their own values and preferences to
infiltrate all their work, it would mean that lawyers were abusing their
privileges by rationing a valuable public service only to those whose views
happen to coincide with their own. However, this does not mandate a
wholesale abrogation of moral responsibility by lawyers. Instead, it suggests
that lawyers should try to better integrate their professional and personal
lives. Re-working the balance between role-morality and personal conscience,
a fresh account of legal ethics would place the individual at the centre of the
process and encourage lawyers to develop a critical morality that encompasses
such pressing issues as "what kind of lawyer do I want to be?" and "what
interests am I going to spend my life serving as a lawyer?" 17
By asking lawyers to cabin their moral judgement, such advice endangers
the whole moral standing of the legal profession. In the traditional approach,
there is very little space for reflection or engagement; reference

to

the rules

is intended to provide definitive and authoritative answers. My approach

suggests that legal ethics has more to do with a practice of situated
reasoning and has more to do with the interests, purposes and consequences
of the participants and their contexts. Reliance on codes atrophies the moral
intelligence and leaves lawyers adrift without a moral compass when those
professional rules run out or give conflicting advice: my approach encourages
continual reflection and therefore better prepares the lawyer for difficult
situations. Indeed, in a manner of speaking, lawyers are in better shape to
avoid and resolve ethical dilemmas because their daily regimen requires them
to challenge and analyse critically most situations and settings.
The other choice for the enlightened lawyer is to abandon the notion of
a professionally differentiated role morality entirely and incorporate all their
personal values into the professional arena. This seems an unwise and
undesirable move as lawyers will be abandoning their public trust and
abusing their monopolistic privileges. The challenge is to integrate the
demands of a professional role with the dictates of a personal morality and
be able to construct important bridges between the two so that they can each
support and fructify each other: one feeds off the other. To provide sound
professional judgement, it is necessary to resort to a well-honed and mature
sense of moral acuity. Unless one subscribes to a very formalistic account
oflaw, a familiarity with and sensitivity to moral issues is an essential quality
that all lawyers must have if they are to advise clients about any particular
area of law or what the courts are likely to do in any particular case. Without
such resources, lawyers will be ill-equipped to fulfill the most basic skills of
legal representation; they become only technicians, not advisers. To flinch this
challenge or to settle it by default is to fail as both a matter of professional
and personal responsibility; it will impoverish both professional and personal

pursuits.
Also, the traditional approach fails to involve the client sufficiently in the
provision of legal services and the fulfilment of client satisfaction. Based on
an assumption that has no empirical or theoretical merit, they are seen to
have fixed interests and stand outside the moral domain of the lawyer. The
reality is that clients rely as much on lawyers to define their interests as they
do to protect them. In my approach, the client is treated as a conversational
partner who can contribute and be persuaded about particular courses of
action and their likely consequences. Indeed, client selection is one of the
most important and most neglected issues for lawyers because, once a client
is taken on, the lawyer does have some responsibility to treat that person
differently than other persons; they are engaged in a special relationship that
lawyers cannot simply abandon as and when they choose. Notwithstanding
rhetoric to the contrary, lawyers can choose whatever clients they wish. In
Canada, there is no equivalent to the English cab-rank rule which requires
barristers to accept any client at a reasonable fee in their area of expertise.
Consequently, lawyers must take responsibility about and for the clients that
they choose to represent.

Practical implications
The requirement for ethical behaviour and moral character flows from the idea
that law is a profession and one in which its members are trustees for the
public good in the administration

of justice. Dating back to Rome's

Theodesian Code and Anglo-Saxon England, lawyers have always been
required to take an oath that they will fulfil their professional responsibilities

in a good and virtuous manner. This is still the case today. New lawyers have
to be certified as being of good character and to swear an oath upon
admission that they will uphold the highest standards of moral integrity.
However, there is very little consensus on what the requirement of moral
character entails or demands. Apart from abstaining from criminal or illegal
activities (or, at least, not getting caught), law societies treat such inquiries in a

pro Jonna way; there is only the most perfunctory inquiry into a person's
moral character that is largely confined to the applicant's own admission
and answers. Applicants are presumed to be of good character and, therefore,
suitable for legal practice unless there is evidence to the contrary. If the
requirement of moral character is to be maintained, then law societies must
begin to take more seriously its testing and certification. Importantly, the
acquisition of legal competence ought not to be treated as equivalent to the
establishment of moral character: they are very different and mutually
exclusive attainments.
A central problem is that, as one critic astutely observes, the inquiry into
moral character is both too early and too late in the overall professional
process. 18 Occurring on entry into the Bar admission courses, it arises before
applicants have experienced any genuine ethical dilemmas under real-world
pressures; they have no practical context in which to put to the test their
ethical intuitions and commitment (or lack of it). However, such institutional
assessments occur only after a considerable investment of time and money in
academic education by fledging lawyers. Like other skills and requirements, the
testing and tutoring of a refined ethical sensibility should be part of a lifelong learning process: there needs to be substantial peer review and a regular
auditing process which would both challenge and train lawyers about the

worth and importance of ethical lawyering. Nevertheless, the question of
whether law schools should police the moral character of their students is hotly
debated and contested-are law schools primarily academic institutions or
gatekeepers for the profession?
Legal ethics is a life-long challenge in which lawyers must be encouraged
to go beyond simply learning the rules and how to apply them; they should
constantly interrogate themselves and their colleagues about the moral status
of their work and practices. Accordingly, lawyers must be helped to hone
and question a sense of moral judgement about themselves and their work.
While many lawyers lead ethical lives and carry much of that over into their
professional lives, there is still a depressing indifference to issues of legal
ethics and a lamentable ignorance about how to identify and deal with
situations that raise ethical queries and challenges. The first task, therefore,
is for people to enhance and interrogate their own sense of moral judgement
and responsibility; this is too often assumed to be in place. Mindful that
ethical training is primarily concerned with learning about oneself, students
need to confront ethical dilemmas in concrete circumstances in order to
begin to discover (or construct), question and articulate their own moral
views before they struggle with the complex demands of a professional ethic.
There is an urgent need to stimulate the moral imagination and cultivate each
person's sense of moral responsibility, such that they are able to develop a
moral facility that is capable of recognising ethical dilemmas, analysing
them, and responding to them in a responsible and realistic way. A pervasive
difficulty in achieving this is that legal ethics is more about responsibilities
than rights and, therefore, does not sit easily or well with much of the legal
education that lawyers receive.

Insofar as the practice of legal ethics is in disarray, the law societies and
the law schools must shoulder a considerable share of the blame for failing
to

provide

an institutional setting

for

establishing

a

sophisticated

understanding of professional responsibility and its demands. Few law schools
take very seriously the need to offer training of a mandatory or optional kind
to its graduates. Certainly, the extent and sophistication of courses in legal
ethics comes nowhere close to mirroring those of the substantive courses.
Furthermore, the courses that do exist tend to treat the teaching of legal
ethics as if it were simply one more course, with the same intellectual
ambitions and pedagogical techniques as business association or torts. In an
important sense, although law schools have not taken the teaching of legal
ethics seriously, they have still instilled within students and lawyers a
certain sense of professional ethics. Indeed, law schools cannot avoid
teaching legal ethics as "the very act of teaching ... creates images of law and
lawyering when we teach doctrine through cases and hypotheticals".
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Unfortunately, reinforced by the general rule-centred attitude to the study of
legal doctrine, law students settle neatly into thinking of legal ethics as
involving a similar process of role-detachment and legalistic application.
To their credit, however, the law societies and law schools have begun to
take their own responsibility in meeting this shortcoming much more
seriously. Stirred into action by some first-rate studies and reform proposals,
20

there is now a compulsory component in most provincial Bar admission

courses. Nevertheless, there is still a considerable way to go as instruction
remains closely tied to the rote-learning of the codes and the tendency to
treat legal ethics the same as other subjects remains pronounced. All in all,
therefore, the efforts to prepare young lawyers for the ethical rigours of legal

practice are still very limited and more an afterthought than a core feature of
the curriculum. It will take a sea-change in both the scope and substance of
courses taught and the style and pedagogy through which they are presented.
As well as altering their attitudes and approach to the teaching of legal
ethics, law societies must encourage their members to adopt a much more
expansive understanding of their ethical responsibilities. It can do this in a
number of ways. At an institutional level, lawyers can be constantly reminded
that they must not neglect or overlook the opportunity to converse with other
lawyers. This can be done by proliferating the forums-in law schools, in
professional gatherings, in

law

firms, etc.-within which dialogue and

engagement can be nurtured and thrive. In this way, lawyers might explore
their own moral intuitions in the testing context of others' views without
risking public criticism or risk. Also, it can be made clear to lawyers that
their moral obligations as professionals extend beyond concern with their own
individual actions and should encompass a responsibility to monitor the
actions of other lawyers. In this way, professional responsibility is as much a
collective as well as personal undertaking in which each lawyer should
contribute to the moral health of the profession as a whole.

Conclusion
As with so much else, de Tocqueville was not only half right about his
assessment of (American) lawyers when he wrote, but his conclusions remain
equally valid and invalid today. He was surely accurate in his pronouncement
that lawyers constituted the new aristocracy of society. However, he was well
wide of the mark in believing that such an elite status was warranted because

the legal profession functioned as the enlightened and sensible guardians of
the public good.21 Although traditional versions of legal ethics are still
defended in the name of public service, there are few lawyers who conduct
their daily professional lives in such a spirit. It is unrealistic to imagine or
expect that every lawyer will, like Socrates, only be guided by the need to do
right rather than wrong: most lawyers are reasonably concerned about their
jobs, paying their mortgages, providing for their kids, etc. Indeed, there is
ample evidence to demonstrate that lawyers will hold to ethical principles when
it is in their interests to do so or, more accurately, when their financial

considerations coincide with their ethical ones.22 However, it is neither
unreasonable nor unrealistic to expect that they can be persuaded, collectively
and individually, to accept the noble challenge of redeeming the legal
profession's moral standing and of fashioning a fresh image of legal ethics
and professional responsibility that serves a fragmented society.
At the heart of any efforts to reaffirm the profession in its own and the
public's moral esteem must be the commitment to emphasise that lawyers
need not and should not spend the bulk of their professional lives doing what
they would shy away from in their personal lives. Can it really be appropriate
that lawyers should act in wilful disregard of moral considerations which
would weigh heavily on them and others in their personal lives? In short,
lawyers must stop asking whether a good lawyer can be a bad person and
begin providing answers to how good persons and good lawyers can co-exist
in the same person. This is a task that all lawyers should relish. Moreover,
legal ethics should not be thought of as something that arises in discrete and
exceptional circumstances. Everything that lawyers do, from the selection of
clients to their involvement in civic affairs, implicates and reflects a lawyer's

approaches and understanding of what it means to be an ethical lawyer. A
lawyer who appreciates the full import of what it demands to be an ethical
lawyer understands that ethical considerations are at the heart of lawyering,
not a peripheral concern. To be a good person and a good lawyer need not
be the oxymoron that Plato and more modern pessimists seem to believe it
to be.
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